Australia and Indonesia have opened Exercise Keris Woomera 26 in East Java, bringing naval, air and ground forces into a training program scheduled for October 12 to 20. Australia describes it as its largest overseas joint training activity of the year.

An opening ceremony took place in Banyuwangi, the Australian Defence release said on October 13. Its announced participation figures were approximately 1,000 Australian Defence Force personnel working with 1,235 members of Indonesia’s armed forces, the TNI. Those are the Australian announcement’s figures, rather than an independently reconciled final attendance count.

The force assembled for the exercise

Australia has embarked its amphibious force on HMAS Choules and deployed HMAS Perth and HMAS Stalwart. Its listed contribution also includes a C-130J Hercules, PC-21 aircraft, M777 howitzers and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, better known as HIMARS.

The mix gives the exercise a purpose beyond gathering units in one location. Moving a force across water, connecting it with aircraft and ground elements, and keeping it supplied demand coordination between services as well as between countries.

An amphibious ship provides a different function from a patrol or combat aircraft. Artillery participation introduces another set of crews, communications and support needs. Their presence in an exercise program demonstrates what is available for training; it does not establish that each system has already completed a firing event.

The broader distinction between a collection of vessels and a force organized for a particular mission is explained in Military Ledger’s guide to naval task groups.

What the program still has to demonstrate

Australian Defence says the planned activities include an amphibious landing in East Java, live-fire exercises on Indonesian ranges and maritime integration between the two navies. These remain elements of the announced program unless a later account confirms their completion.

The exercise follows the first Keris Woomera iteration in 2024. Australia places the cooperation within its wider security relationship with Indonesia, including the 2024 Defence Cooperation Agreement.

Training together can expose practical differences in procedures and coordination. It does not make two armed forces interchangeable, and an opening ceremony cannot establish the readiness achieved by the end of an exercise. That distinction is also why unit names and headcounts tell only part of a force’s story.

For this iteration, the next useful evidence is a record of the serials actually conducted, the participating capabilities and any lessons the two forces choose to publish. Until then, the clear development is the start of a substantial bilateral training activity, with its most demanding outcomes still to be assessed.