An arms-export announcement can describe permission to negotiate, a proposed sale, a signed agreement or equipment already shipped. Those are different events, recorded by different institutions. Understanding who produced a document is the first step toward understanding what it proves.
The distinction goes beyond whether an announcement equals a delivery. Export controls involve legal permission and oversight; procurement creates commitments; shipping moves equipment; public registers describe transfers afterward. One transaction can appear in several systems at different values without any of those records being wrong.
Who can authorize an export?
In the United States, Foreign Military Sales, or FMS, is a government-to-government channel. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency's management manual describes requests, case development and Letters of Offer and Acceptance. Section C5.7 addresses congressional notification under the Arms Export Control Act.
When notification is required, Congress receives a proposed sale for statutory review. Notification is not a congressional vote approving every transaction, and it does not certify that equipment has crossed a border. Applicable thresholds and procedures depend on the recipient, transaction and legal provision; a threshold from one channel should not be applied to another.
Direct Commercial Sales involve a different relationship: a supplier contracts with a foreign customer, while US export authorization remains relevant. ITAR section 123.1 sets licensing requirements for covered defense articles, subject to exemptions. Section 123.15 addresses congressional certification for certain transactions. A commercial contract does not replace the required government permission.
In the European Union, national authorities make licensing decisions within national systems and the common framework. The Council's April 2025 review updated that framework and its guide for licensing officers, including work on end-user verification and tracing. A common framework does not mean one EU office issues every national export license.
Poland’s Abrams purchase: three figures, three records
The US notification for Poland’s M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams package, transmittal 22-20, listed 250 tanks and associated equipment and support, with an estimated program cost of $6 billion. The document says it was delivered to Congress on February 17, 2022. Its publication in the Federal Register on September 27, 2023 was a later publication event, not a new sale on that date.
Poland's Defense Ministry subsequently described an April 2022 agreement worth $4.75 billion covering 250 tanks, accompanying equipment, training, logistics and ammunition. That is the buyer's description of its acquisition package.
General Dynamics then announced on August 25, 2022 a US Army FMS order worth up to $1.148 billion to supply 250 tanks. This is a contractor order with its own scope, not a replacement valuation of every element in Poland's package.
The figures therefore should not be added together, treated as three successive payments or used to calculate a simple per-tank price. The notification includes a proposed package; the ministry describes an agreement; the company describes its order. Without matching their scope and terms, subtracting one from another does not establish a saving or missing money.
None of these three documents alone establishes the final number delivered. For that, the next evidence would be dated acceptance or delivery records. A scheduled delivery year remains a schedule until completion is documented. The same separation between authority, commitments and payments matters when reading a defense budget.
What a UN report tells you
The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, UNROCA, is a transparency mechanism built around national submissions. It covers seven main conventional-arms categories and also seeks reporting on small arms and light weapons. It is not an export licensing authority or a complete, instantaneous customs ledger.
A UN disarmament-office reporting circular illustrates the distinction: states with no qualifying imports or exports were asked to submit a nil report. A nil report is therefore a positive statement about the reporting period. No submission is a different condition; it cannot safely be read as zero transfers.
When comparing countries, check the reporting year, categories, submission date and whether both exporter and importer reported. Gaps or mismatches may reflect timing, definitions or incomplete participation. They require examination rather than automatic conclusions about concealment or illegality.
Why SIPRI’s TIV has no currency sign
SIPRI uses open sources to track transfers of major conventional weapons. Its sources and methods distinguish order information from delivery data and explain a common measure called the trend-indicator value, or TIV. TIV supports comparisons of transfer volumes; it is not a sales price, export revenue or military expenditure.
SIPRI's own example assigns six F-15 Advanced Eagle aircraft delivered by the United States to Qatar in 2025 a combined 450 million TIV, calculated as six times 75 million. That does not mean Qatar paid $450 million. Adding a dollar sign would change the meaning of the measure.
The useful habit is to label every number before comparing it: license value, notified estimate, agreement value, contractor order, delivered quantity or TIV. These records illuminate different stages. If the question concerns whether a transfer was prohibited or properly enforced, that requires the relevant legal rules and enforcement evidence, not merely an entry or absence in a public database.